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Abstract. Production distributed systems are challenging to formally verify, in
particular when they are based on distributed protocols that are not rigorously
described or fully understood. In this paper, we derive models and properties for
two core distributed protocols used in eventually consistent production key-value
stores such as Riak and Cassandra. We propose a novel modeling called cer-
tified program models, where complete distributed systems are captured as pro-
grams written in traditional systems languages such as concurrent C. Specifically,
we model the read-repair and hinted-handoff recovery protocols as concurrent C
programs, test them for conformance with real systems, and then verify that they
guarantee eventual consistency, modeling precisely the specification as well as
the failure assumptions under which the results hold.
1 Introduction
Distributed systems are complex software systems that pose myriad challenges to for-
mal verification. Some systems are constructed from rigorously described distributed
algorithms [1], which requires bridging a substantial gap from an abstract algorithm to
executable code [2]. The implementation of distributed protocols developed this way
is, of course, not usually formally proven to be a refinement of the textbook algorithm,
though some research on developing the implementation using formally verified refine-
ments has been done [3]. However, most production systems have not been built through
a top-down approach from well-understood and proven-on-paper algorithms, but rather
have been developed in an ad-hoc fashion, from scratch (e.g., on whiteboards), undergo-
ing iteration and revision over a long period of time. A large bulk of today’s open-source
distributed systems software fits this category, the most prominent among these being
key-value/NoSQL storage systems. Consequently, to understand the formal properties
guaranteed by these systems, we need to build high-level protocol models and infer
the properties guaranteed by these protocols using the implementation and its available
documentation.
In this paper, we build models and using them derive formal properties for two
core distributed protocols used in eventually consistent distributed key-value stores: the
hinted-handoff protocol and the read-repair protocol. Eventually consistent key-value
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stores originate from the Dynamo system by Amazon [4] and are currently implemented
in production key-value stores such as Cassandra1 and Riak2. They are used widely to-
day, e.g., Amazon relies on Dynamo for its shopping cart, and Cassandra is used by
Netflix and many other companies. Yet, none of these systems were built from rigor-
ously proven distributed algorithms.
Our approach is to model the high-level protocols in these implementations, and
then derive formal properties that the models guarantee by finding properties that are
formally verifiable for the models. We derive formal properties for the two protocols
mentioned above and verify them (against the model) by using a novel methodology
called certified programs models, where a high-level distributed algorithm is modeled
using programs written in traditional systems languages, e.g., C with concurrency, and
then certified to be correct against their specifications using program verification. The
program models capture not only the behavior of distributed processes and their mem-
ory and secondary storage states, but also network communication, delays, and failures,
using non-determinism where necessary.
Modeling and verification using certified program models has several salient as-
pects. First, program models are executable and can be validated for conformance to
the system using testing, where the programmer can write test harnesses that control in-
puts as well as physical events such as node and network failures, and test using mature
systematic testing tools for concurrent software, e.g., CHESS [5]. Moreover, program
models permit accurate modeling of specifications of protocols using ghost state as
well as assertions in powerful logics. Finally, program models lend themselves well
to program verification techniques, especially using tools such as VCC [6] that auto-
mate large parts of the reasoning using logical constraint solvers. Our experience in this
work shows that certified programs models are an appealing sweet spot for verifying
distributed prototcols, that facilitates executable models that capture arbitrarily param-
eterized protocols and at the same time are amenable to mostly automated verification.
1.1 Key-value Stores and Eventual Consistency
Key-value storage systems arose out of the CAP theorem/conjecture, which was postu-
lated by Brewer and proved by Gilbert and Lynch [7]. The conjecture states that a dis-
tributed storage system can choose at most two out of three important characteristics—
strong data Consistency (i.e., linearizability or sequential consistency), Availability of
data (to reads and writes), and Partition-tolerance. Hence, achieving strong consistency
while at the same time providing availability in a partitioned system with failures is
impossible. While traditional databases preferred consistency and availability, the new
generation of key-value systems are designed to be partition-tolerant, both within a dat-
acenter as well as across multiple data-centers. As a result, a key-value system is forced
to chose between one of either strong consistency or availability—the latter option pro-
vides lower latencies for reads and writes [8]. Key-value systems that prefer availability
include Cassandra, Riak, and Dynamo [4], and support weak models of consistency
(e.g., eventual consistency). Other key-value systems, e.g., Bigtable [9], instead prefer
strong consistency, and may be unavailable under failure scenarios.
1 http://cassandra.apache.org
2 http://basho.com/products/riak-kv/
One popular weak consistency notion is eventual consistency, which roughly speak-
ing, says that if no further updates are made to a given data item, all replicas will
eventually hold the same value (and a read would then produce this value) [4]. Even-
tual consistency is a liveness property, not a safety property [10]. The precise notion
of what eventual consistency means in these protocols (the precise assumptions under
which they hold, the failure models, the assumptions on the environment, etc.) are not
well understood, let alone proven. Programmers also do not understand the subtleties
of eventually consistent stores; for instance, default modes in Riak and Cassandra can
permanently lose writes—this has been exploited in an attack involving Bitcoin3.
1.2 Contributions
The primary contribution of this paper is to precisely reason about the guarantees of
eventual consistency that two core protocols used in production implementations of
key-value stores provide. More specifically, we model and verify the correctness of the
hinted-handoff protocol and the read-repair protocol, which are anti-entropy mech-
anisms first proposed in the Amazon Dynamo system [4], and later implemented in
systems such as Riak and Cassandra.
We build program models for these protocols in concurrent C that we verify for
eventual consistency. The programs use threads to model concurrency, where each
get/put operation as well as the asynchronous calls they make are modeled using con-
currently running threads. The state of the processes, such as stores at replicas and
the hinted-handoff tables, are modeled as shared arrays. Communication between pro-
cesses is also modeled using data-structures: the network is simulated using a set that
stores pending messages to replicas, with an independent thread sending them to their
destinations. Failures and non-determinism of message arrivals, etc., are also captured
programmatically using non-determinism (modeled using stubs during verification and
using random coin-tosses during testing). In particular, system latency is captured by
background threads that are free to execute any time, modeling arbitrarily long delays.
In the case of the hinted-handoff protocol, we prove that this protocol working
alone guarantees eventual consistency provided there are only transient faults. In fact,
we prove a stronger theorem by showing that for any operation based (commutative)
conflict-free replicated data-type implementing a register, the protocol ensures strong
eventual consistency— this covers a variety of schemes that systems use, including
Riak and Cassandra, to resolve conflict when implementing a key-value store. Strong
eventual consistency guarantees not only eventual consistency, but that the store always
contains a value which is a function of the set of updates it has received, independent
of the order in which it was received. We prove this by showing that the hinted-handoff
protocol (under only transient failures) ensures eventual delivery of updates—when this
is combined with an idempotent and commutative datastructure like a CmRDT [11] ,
it ensures strong eventual consistency. We model the eventual delivery property in the
program model using a ghost taint that taints a particular write at a coordinator (unbe-
knownst to protocol), and asserts that the taint propagates eventually to every replica.
Like eventual consistency, eventual delivery is also a liveness property. It is established
3 http://hackingdistributed.com/2014/04/06/another-one-bites-the-dust-flexcoin/
by finding a ranking function that models abstractly the time needed to reach a consis-
tent state, and a slew of corresponding safety properties to prove this program correct.
For the read-repair protocol, the literature and documentation of the above systems
indicated that a read-repair (issued during a read) would bring the nodes that are alive
to a consistent state eventually. However, while attempting to prove this property, we
realized that no invariant could prove this property, and that it is false. In fact, a single
read is insufficient to reach eventual consistency. Hence, we prove a more complex
property: beyond a point, if a set of nodes are alive and they all stay alive, and if all
requests stop except for an unbounded sequence of reads to a key, then the live nodes
that are responsible for the key will eventually converge. In other words, one read is not
enough for convergence, and the system needs a long series of reads.
Note that the certification that the program models satisfy their specification is for
an unbounded number of threads, which model an unbounded number of replicas, keys,
values, etc., model arbitrarily long input sequences of updates and reads to the keys, and
model the concurrency prevalent in the system using parallelism in the program. The
verification is hence a complete verification of the models, in contrast to approaches
using under-approximations to systematically test a bounded-resource system [12,13].
Our approach is to model protocols using C programs, which we believe are much
simpler for systems engineers to use to model protocols, and being executable, are easy
to test using test harnesses. Most importantly, we have proved the entire behavior of
the protocol correct using the program verification framework VCC [6] that automates
several stages of the reasoning.
Paper Organization. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives more
details on key-value stores, eventual consistency, and the read-repair and hinted-handoff
anti-entropy protocols. We state our main results in Section 3, where we describe the
precise properties we prove for the protocol models as well as some properties that we
expected to be true initially, but which we learned were not true in general. Section 4
describes our program models of protocols in detail, including the testing approach
we used to check that our model was reasonable. The verification process, including
background on program verification, the invariants and ranking functions required for
proving the properties is covered in Section 5. Section 6 describes related work and
Section 7 concludes.
2 Background
In this section, we describe the read and write paths involved in a key-value store, and
the anti-entropy protocols which are used to implement eventual consistency by recon-
ciling divergent distributed replicas. Key-value stores persist pairs of keys and values,
and usually have two basic operations: get(key) for retrieving the value correspond-
ing to a key, and put(key, value) for storing the value of a particular key. Key-value
stores typically use consistent hashing [14] to distribute keys to servers, and each key
is replicated across multiple servers for fault tolerance. When a client issues a put or
get operation, it first interacts with a server, e.g., the server closest to the client. This
server acts as a coordinator: it coordinates the client and replica servers to complete
the put and get operations. The CAP theorem [7] implies that during network partitions
(where servers are split into two groups with no intercommunication), a key-value store
must choose either strong consistency (linearizability) [15] or availability. Even when
the network is not partitioned, the system is sometimes configured to favor latency over
consistency [16]. As a result, popular key-value stores expose tunable consistency lev-
els. These consistency levels control the number of servers the coordinator needs to
hear from before declaring success on reads and writes. For instance, a write threshold
of one allows the system to return with success after writing to just one replica. When
the sum of read and write thresholds is greater than the number of replicas, the system
will ensure strong consistency.
In general, a consistency model can be characterized by its restrictions on opera-
tion ordering. The strongest models, e.g., linearizability [15] severely restrict possible
operation orderings that can lead to correct behavior. Eventual consistency, in contrast,
is one of the weakest consistency models. Informally, it guarantees that, if no further
updates are made to a given data item, reads to that item will eventually return the same
value [17]. Thus, until some undefined time in the future when the system is supposed
to converge, the user can never rule out the possibility of data inconsistency.
To achieve high availability and reliability, key value stores typically replicate data
on multiple servers. For example, each key can be replicated on N servers, where N is a
configurable parameter. In the weakest consistency setting (with read and write thresh-
olds of one), each get and put operation only touches one replica (e.g., the one closest
to the coordinator). Thus, in the worst case scenario where all puts go to one server, and
all get operations are served by a different server, the replicas will never converge to the
same value. To ensure convergence to the same value, production key-value stores em-
ploy anti-entropy protocols [18]. An anti-entropy protocol operates by comparing repli-
cas and reconciling differences. The three main anti-entropy protocols are read-repair,
hinted-handoff, and node-repair. While the first two are real-time protocols involved in,
respectively, the read and write paths, the third one is an offline protocol, which runs
periodically to repair out-of-sync nodes (e.g., when a node rejoins after recovering from
a crash). Here, we only consider the real-time anti-entropy protocols.
Read-repair [4] is a real-time anti-entropy mechanism that ensures that all replicas
have (eventually) the most recent version of a value for a given key. In a typical read
path, the coordinator forwards read requests to all replicas, and waits for a consistency
level (CL out of N) number of replicas to reply. If read-repair is enabled, the coordinator
checks all the read responses (from the nodes currently alive), determines the most
recent read value, and finally pushes the latest version to all out of date replicas.
Hinted-handoff [4], unlike read-repair, is part of the write path. It offers full write
availability in case of failures, and can improve consistency after temporary network
failures. When the coordinator finds that one of the replicas responsible for storing an
update is temporarily down (e.g., based on failure detector predictions), it stores a hint
meta-data for the down node for a configurable duration of time. Once the coordinator
detects that the down node is up, it will attempt to send the stored hint to that recovered
node. Thus hinted-handoff ensures that no writes are lost, even in the presence of tem-
porary node failures. In other words, this mechanism is used to ensure that eventually
all writes are propagated to all the replicas responsible for the key.
3 Characterizing and Proving Eventual Consistency
To model and verify the read-repair and hinted-handoff protocols, we first abstract away
from the particular instantiation of these protocols in these systems, and also abstract
away from the various options they provide to users to modify the behavior of the
system. For instance, in Riak, using one set of options, every write is tagged with a
vector clock at the client, and every replica responsible for it maps it to a set of values,
one for each last concurrent write that it has received. When a read is issued, Riak
can return the set of all last concurrently written values to it (these values are called
“siblings” in Riak). However, in Cassandra, vector clocks are not used; instead each
client labels every write with a timestamp, and despite there being drift among the
clocks of clients, each replica stores only the last write according to this timestamp.
We capture these instantiations by generalizing the semantics of how the store is
maintained. For the hinted-handoff protocol, we prove eventual consistency under the
assumption that the stores are maintained using some idempotent operation-based com-
mutative replicated data-type (CRDT) [11,19] that implements a register, while for
read-repair, we prove eventual consistency assuming an arbitrary form of conflict res-
olution. We consider two failure modes: (a) transient failure where failed nodes and
network edges remember their pre-crash state when they come back; and (b) perma-
nent failure where failed nodes or network edges lose memory and start with some
default state when they come back.
3.1 Properties of the Hinted-Handoff Protocol
The hinted-handoff protocol is an opportunistic anti-entropy mechanism that happens
during writes. When a write is issued, and the asynchronous call to write to certain
replicas fail (either explicitly or due to a timeout), the coordinator knows that these
replicas could be out of sync, and hence stores these update messages in a hinted-
handoff table locally to send them later to the replicas when they come back alive.
However, if there is a memory wipe or a permanent failure, the hinted-handoff table
will be lost, and all replicas may not receive the messages. In practice, the read-repair
and node-repair protocols protect against such failures.
Our main abstraction of the key-value store is to view the underlying protocol
as implementing a register using an operation-based conflict-free replicated datatype
(CRDT) [19], also called a commutative replicated data-type (CmRDT). As in the work
of Shapiro et al. [11], a register is a memory cell storing opaque content. A register can
be queried using a read operation get, and updated with a value v using a write operation
put(v). The semantics of non-concurrent put operations corresponds to the expected se-
quential semantics. However, when concurrent put operations do not commute, the two
common conflict resolution approaches are that (a) one operation takes precedence over
the other and (b) both operations are retained. When the former approach is used, the
register said to be a last write wins (LWW) register, and when the latter approach is
used, it is said to be a multi-valued (MV) register. When implementing a simple key-
value store, the vector-clock based updates in Riak can be seen as an MV register, while
the simpler timestamp based updates in Cassandra can be seen as an LWW register [11].
We also assume another property of these CmRDTs, namely idempotency—we assume
that all messages are tagged with a unique id, and when a message is delivered multiple
times, the effect on the store is the same as when exactly one message is delivered. Let
us call such registers idempotent CRDTs.
The main property we prove about the hinted-handoff protocol is called eventual de-
livery. This property says that every successful write eventually gets delivered to every
replica at least once (under assumptions on the kinds of possible failures and on replicas
being eventually alive, etc.). Hence, instead of eventual consistency, we argue eventual
delivery, which in fact is the precise function of these protocols, as they are agnostic of
the conflict resolution mechanism that is actually implemented in the system. Further-
more, assuming that each replica actually implements an idempotent operation-based
CRDT register, and update procedures for these datatypes are terminating, eventual de-
livery ensures eventual consistency, and in fact strong eventual consistency [19]. Strong
eventual consistency guarantees not only eventual consistency, but also that the store al-
ways contains a value that is a function of the set of updates it has received, independent
of the order in which they were received.
Theorem 1. The hinted-handoff protocol ensures eventual delivery of updates to all
replicas, provided there are only transient faults. More precisely, if there is any suc-
cessful write, then assuming that all replicas recover at some point, and reads and
write requests stop coming at some point, the write will eventually get propagated to
every replica.
We formally prove the above result (and Theorem 2 below) for arbitrary system con-
figurations using program verification techniques on the program model; see Section 4
and Section 5 for details. The following is an immediate corollary from the properties
of eventual delivery and idempotent CRDTs:
Corollary 1. A system following the hinted-handoff protocol, where each replica runs
an operation-based idempotent CRDT mechanism that has terminating updates, is strong-
ly eventually consistent, provided there are only transient faults.
3.2 Properties of the Read-repair Protocol
Our second result concerns the read-repair protocol. Read-repair is expected to be re-
silient to memory-crash failures, but only guarantees eventual consistency on a key
provided future reads are issued at all to the key. Again, we abstract away from the con-
flict resolution mechanism, and we assume that the coordinator, when doing a read and
getting different replies from replicas, propagates some consistent value back to all the
replicas. This also allows our result to accommodate anti-entropy mechanisms [18] that
are used instead of read-repair, in a reactive manner after a read. Note that this result
holds irrespective of the hinted-handoff protocol being enabled or disabled.
It is commonly believed4 that when a read happens, the read repair protocol will
repair the live nodes at the time of the read (assuming they stay alive), bringing them to
a common state. We modeled the read-repair protocol and tried to prove this property,
but we failed to come up with appropriate invariants that would ensure the property. This
4 http://wiki.apache.org/cassandra/ReadRepair
led us to conclude that the property is not always true. To see why, consider the timeline
in Figure 1. In this scenario, the client issues a put request with the value 2, which is
routed by the coordinator to all three replicas– A,B, and C (via messages wA(2),wB(2),
and wC(2)). The replica C successfully updates its local store with this value. Consider
the case when the write consistency is one and the put operation succeeds (in spite of
the message wB(2) being lost and the message wA(2) being delayed). Now assume that
the replica C crashes, and the last write (with value 2) is in none of the alive replicas– A
and B. If we consider the case where B has the latest write (with value 1) among these
two live nodes, a subsequent read-repair would write the value 1 read from B to A′s
store (via message rrwA(1) in Figure 1). But before this write reaches A, A could get a
pending message from the network (wA(2)) and update its value to a more recent value–
2. In this situation, after replica A has updated its value to 2, the two alive replicas (A
and B) do not have consistent values. Due to the lack of hints or processes with hints
having crashed, B may never receive the later write (message wB(2)).
Coordinator Replica A Replica B Replica C
𝑉 = 0
V=1
V=2
V=2
V=2
put(2)
get()
𝑤𝐵(2) 𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐶
Replica C
crashed
𝑟𝑑𝐴(0)
𝑤𝐶(2)
𝑤𝐴(2)
𝑟𝑑𝐵(1)
𝑟𝑟𝑤𝐴(1)
Fig. 1. A timeline showing that a single read-repair operation does not guarantee convergence
of live replicas. In the figure, wr is a write messages to replica r, rdr is a message from replica
r to the coordinator on the read path, and rrwr is the read-repair message to replica r. Time in
the figure advances from top to bottom. The messages along the read(-repair) path are shown as
dotted lines and along the write path as solid lines.
Based on these insights, we prove a more involved property of read-repair:
Theorem 2. After any sequence of reads and writes, if all operations stop except for
an infinite sequence of reads of a key, then assuming the set R of replicas are alive at
the time of the first such read and thereafter, the replicas in R will eventually converge
to the same value.
We prove the above result also using program verification on the program model.
Intuitively, as long as an indefinite number of reads to the key happen, the system will
ensure that the subset of live replicas responsible for the key converge to the same
value, eventually. A read-repair may not bring the live replicas to sync if there are some
pending messages in the system. However, since there is only a finite amount of lag in
the system (pending messages and hints, etc.), and once the system is given enough time
to finish its pending work, a read-repair will succeed in synchronizing these replicas.
4 Program Models for the Protocols
In this section we describe how we model the anti-entropy protocols used in eventually
consistent key-value stores. The architecture of our model is depicted in Figure 2.
query replicas
wait for response 
from R replicas
return value if 
consistent, else 
report failure
spawn read-repair
get(key)
return value from 
the local store
read_ls(key)
send writes to all 
replicas
on failure/timeout 
write to hint store
return success when 
W replicas succeed, 
else report failure
put(key, value)
pending 
store send write to 
replica or model 
failure / timeout
network()
write value to the local 
store
write_ls(key, value)
local 
store
hint 
store
take hints and try to 
write them to the 
replica
handoff_hint()
wait for responses 
from all replicas
read_repair()
write a value to 
replicas with 
inconsistent value
Client
remove operations from 
pending store
restore any local store to its 
default
destroy hint_store table
permanent_failures()
Replica A
Replica B
Fig. 2. Architecture of the model with boxes for functions, ellipses for data structures and arrows
for communication.
4.1 Program Model Overview
Our C program model represents replicas as concurrently executing threads that com-
municate by asynchronous message passing. Each replica uses several functions (get,
put, write ls, read ls, etc.) to update their state and communicate. Replica state is kept
in globally shared array data structures (local store, hint store, etc.). Furthermore, in
order to model asynchronous messaging, we maintain a data structure pending store,
that represents messages in the network that have not yet been delivered. The functions
in our model include:
– The get and put functions at coordinators that forms the interface to clients for
reading and writing key-values.
– An internal function handoff hint for each replica that runs all the time and removes
hints from the hinted-handoff table and propagates them to the appropriate replicas
(provided they are alive).
– An internal function read repair which is part of the read path, waits for all the
replicas to reply, and on detecting replicas with inconsistent values writes the con-
sistent value to those replicas.
– Internal functions read ls and write ls, that read from and write to the local stores
(provided they are alive).
– An internal function network that is invoked repeatedly and delivers messages in
the pending store to replicas.
– An internal function permanent failures, which when permanent failure is modeled
is invoked repeatedly, and can remove elements from the pending set (modeling loss
of messages), restore any local store to its default value (modeling store crashes),
and destroy hinted-handoff tables.
Note that modeling these function using fine-grained concurrency ensures the possi-
bility of arbitrary interleaving of function invocations as well as arbitrary delays. Also,
transient failures, where nodes fail but resume later with the correct state, can be seen
as delays in processes, and hence are captured in this concurrency model. The thread
that delivers messages in the pending set captures arbitrary delays in the network. The
read ls and write ls functions are modeled abstractly as idempotent CRDTs by defining
them as stubs which maintain specified properties. When testing, these functions need
to be instantiated to particular conflict-resolution strategies (e.g., MV or LWW).
When a client issues a get request for a key in our model, the request is routed
to the coordinator that is determined for this key according to an abstract map (hence
capturing all possible hashing schemes). Every key-value pair is replicated across mul-
tiple nodes, where the number of nodes that contain the key-value pair is determined
by a replication factor. The coordinator maintains a preference list of replicas that con-
tain data values for keys that are mapped to it. Along the read path, the coordinator
asynchronously issues the read request to all replica threads (an asynchronous call to a
replica is depicted in Figure 2 as an arrow from the get function to read ls). As shown
in Figure 2, the coordinator blocks for a non-deterministic amount of time or until
it receives enough responses (the arrow directed from read ls to get) as specified by
the read consistency level R. After receiving responses from R replicas, it returns the
read value(s) to the client. If read-repair is enabled, the coordinator also spawns a back-
ground thread (depicted as a call to read repair from get in Figure 2) which will wait for
responses from the other replicas for a non-deterministic amount of time. This thread
determines the most recent data value of all the values stored in the various replicas,
and writes it to the replicas with stale values.
When a client issues a put request to store a key-value pair, the request is routed to
the appropriate coordinator. The coordinator asynchronously issues write requests to all
replica threads in its preference list. The coordinator then blocks for a non-deterministic
amount of time or until it receives enough responses, as specified by the write consis-
tency level W . To model arbitrary network delays and replica failures, write operations
to these replicas are inserted by the coordinator into the pending store (in Figure 2, this
is depicted as an arrow from put to pending store). If the coordinator receives responses
from W replicas, it informs the client about the successful put operation.
A background network thread models arbitrary network delays and failure scenarios
as it removes writes operation from the pending store data structure and either updates
the local store of the appropriate replica with the write or simply loses the operation.
When the hinted-handoff protocol is enabled and read-repair is disabled, we assume
that the write operations are not lost. In this scenario, when losing/removing the write
operation from the pending store, the network thread inserts the operation as a hint in
the hinted-handoff table of the appropriate coordinator. The permanent failures thread
does not execute in this case and data in the global data structures is not lost.
4.2 Program Model Testing and Validation
We tested our program model to make sure that it corresponds to actual systems. For
our tests, we implemented the stubs for model failure and non-determinism in message
arrivals. In particular, we used random coin-tosses instead of non-deterministic choices
as in the verification model. We also provided concrete implementations for conflict-
resolution strategies for operations on CRDTs in the form of LWW and MV. We then
wrote a test harness that arbitrarily issues put and get operations for various key-value
pairs. We then checked that the results of these operations could be realized by the actual
eventually consistent key-value stores. We also used CHESS [5], which is a systematic
testing tool for concurrent programs, to systematically enumerate all possible thread
schedules. Using CHESS, we were able to ensure that our model realized strange but
possible behaviors of the eventually-consistent stores.
We exhaustively tested many scenarios. Here, we discuss a configuration with three
replicas, where the write consistency level is set to two, and the read consistency level
is set to one. One interesting scenario is where the client successfully performs a write
operation on a key with a value 0, followed by an unsuccessful write on the same key
with a value 1. A subsequent read of the key returns the value 1. This is a counterintu-
itive scenario, but it can manifest in a real system because failures are not guaranteed
to leave the stores unaffected and an unsuccessful write can still write to some of the
replicas. In another scenario, the client successfully performs two consecutive write op-
erations to a key with values 0 and 1. Subsequently, one read returns the value 1, while
a subsequent read returns the stale value 0. This behavior can happen in a real system
where the client gets staler values over time. In particular, this scenario occurs when
the two replicas store the value 1 after the second write operation (remember the write
consistency level is two) and the third replica still stores the stale value 0. Finally, we
consider a scenario where there are four consecutive successful writes to a key with
values 0, 1, 2, and 3. (As above, consider a configuration with three replicas but where
both read and write consistency levels are set to one.) If the subsequent two reads for
the same key return values 2 followed by 1, then a following third read cannot return
the value 0. This scenario cannot happen because the three replicas must have values
1, 2, and 3 at the time of the last read (the reader is invited to work this case out on
paper). We used CHESS to confirm the realizability of the first three scenarios, and the
infeasibility of the last scenario. We were also able to observe some of these scenarios
in a real installation of Cassandra.
5 Verification of the Anti-entropy protocols
In this section, we describe our verification methodology, and our verification of the
hinted-handoff and read-repair anti-entropy protocols using the program model. We use
the deductive verification style for proving programs correct. For sequential programs,
this style is close to Hoare logic style reasoning [20]. It proceeds by the programmer
annotating each method with pre/post conditions and annotating loops with loop invari-
ants with desirable program properties. Furthermore, in order to prove that functions
terminate, the user provides ranking functions for loops (and recursive calls) that map
states to natural numbers and must strictly decrease with each iteration. Reasoning that
annotations are correct is done mostly automatically using SMT solvers.
There are several different approaches to verify concurrent programs, especially for
modular verification. We use the VCC tool [6] to verify our models. VCC is a verifier for
concurrent C programs. The basic approach we take to verify our models is to treat each
concurrent thread as a sequential thread for verification purposes, but where every ac-
cess to a shared variable is preceded and succeeded by a havoc that entirely destroys the
structures shared with other threads. However, this havoc-ing is guarded by an invariant
for the global structures that the user provides. Furthermore, we check that whenever
a thread changes a global structure, it maintains this global invariant. This approach
to verification is similar to rely-guarantee reasoning [21], where all threads rely and
guarantee to maintain the global invariant on the shared structures.
Another key aspect of the verification process is writing the specification. Though
the specification is written mainly as assertions and demanding that certain functions
terminate, specifications are often described accurately using ghost code [20,6]. Ghost
code is code written purely for verification purposes (it does not get executed) and is
written as instructions that manipulate ghost variables. It is syntactically constrained
so that real code can never see the ghost state. Hence this ensures that the ghost code
cannot affect the real code. We use ghost code to model the taint-based specification
for eventual delivery (see Section 5.1). It is important that the protocol does not see the
tainted write, because we do not want a flow of information between the executable pro-
gram and the specification. We also use ghost code to maintain abstractions of concrete
data structures (e.g., a set abstracts an array).
We performed the program model verification on an Intel Core i7 laptop with 8 GB
of RAM, running Windows 8 and using Visual Studio 2012 with VCC v2.3 as a plugin.
Our model5 consists of about 1500 lines of code and annotations, where about 900 lines
are executable C code and the rest are annotations not seen by the C compiler.
5.1 Verifying the Hinted-handoff Protocol
As explained in Section 3, verification that the hinted-handoff protocol maintains strong
eventual consistency under transient failures and for idempotent operation-based CRDT
reduces to verification of eventual delivery. Recall that eventual delivery is the property
that every successful write eventually gets delivered to every replica at least once.
We model eventual delivery using a ghost field taint, that records a particular (ex-
actly one) write operation issued to the coordinator. We assert that this taint will even-
tually propagate to each replica’s local store. Intuitively, the write that was chosen to be
tainted will taint the value written, and this taint will persist as the value moves across
the network, including when it is stored in the hint store and the pending store, before
being written to the local store. Taints persist and do not disappear when they reach
the local store. Hence, demanding that the local stores eventually get tainted captures
the property that the chosen write is eventually delivered at least once to every local
store. Note that the tainted values are system-agnostic ghost fields, and hence proving
the above property for an arbitrary write ensures that all writes are eventually delivered.
To prove the specification, we introduce 3 ghost fields: (a) ls tainted nodes, the set
of replicas that have updated their local store with the tainted write, (b) hs tainted nodes,
the set of replicas for which the coordinator has stored the tainted write operation as a
5 The code is available at https://github.com/palmskog/evcons-model
hint in its hint store, and (c) ps tainted nodes, the set of replicas for which the tainted
write has been issued, but where its delivery is pending in the network.
We add ghost code to maintain the semantics of the taint in various functions, in-
cluding put, network and handoff hint. Every time any of these functions transfers val-
ues, we ensure that the taints also get propagated. When a value is written to a local
store, the store is considered tainted if it either already had a tainted value or the new
value being written is tainted; otherwise, it is untainted. Furthermore, we add ghost
code to update the ghost fields described above.
For eventual delivery, we want to prove that, when all replicas remain available
and all the read/write operations have stopped, the tainted write operation is eventually
propagated to the local stores of all the replicas. We prove eventual taintedness of stores
by proving a global termination property. We model the point where inputs stop arriving
using a variable stop and by making all nodes alive while disabling the functions get
and put. We then prove, using a ranking function, that the model will eventually reach
a state where all nodes corresponding to the tainted key are tainted. We first specify
a (safety) invariant for the shared state and specify a ranking function on the state for
arguing eventual taintedness. The invariant of the shared state asserts that for every
replica responsible for the tainted key, either its local store is tainted or there is a tainted
write pending in the network for it, or there is a hint in the corresponding coordinator
which has a tainted write for it. More precisely, for each replica responsible for the
tainted key, we demand that the replica is in one of the ghost sets:
∀r. ( r ∈ ps tainted nodes ∨ r ∈ hs tainted nodes ∨ r ∈ ls tainted nodes ),
where the quantification is over replicas r responsible for the tainted key. The rank-
ing function is a function that quantifies, approximately, the time it would take for
the system to reach a consistent state. In our case, the ranking function |hint store|+
2 · |pending store| suffices. We prove that the rank decreases every time the function ex-
ecutes. Finally, we assert and prove that when the rank is zero, all nodes corresponding
to the tainted key are tainted.
5.2 Verifying the Read-repair Protocol
As explained in Section 3, we want to verify that the read-repair protocol maintains
eventual consistency in the presence of permanent failures (as stated in Result 2 in Sec-
tion 3.2). We prove this result both when hinted-handoff is turned on as well as when
it is disabled (we capture whether hinted-handoff is enabled/disabled using a macro
directive, and prove both versions correct). For simplicity of presentation we only ex-
plain here the case when the hinted handoff protocol is disabled. Recall that permanent
failures can (a) modify the local store by setting them to default values, (b) remove an
operation from the pending store, and (c) destroy the hint store.
For eventual consistency, we want to prove that when all the write operations have
successfully returned to the client, then after only a finite number of read operations
on a key, the read-repair mechanism ensures that the set of R available replicas will
converge. When the writes stop and only the read of a particular key occurs, we disallow
the scheduling of put and disallow get on all but the tainted key, and also bring all
nodes alive and disable the methods that model failure of nodes. We verify eventual
consistency by specifying safety invariants and a ranking function. The main component
of the ranking function is the size of the pending store, |pending store|, which decreases
whenever the network executes.
6 Related Work
Amazon’s use of formal techniques [13] for increasing confidence in the correctness of
their production distributed systems is in the same spirit as our work. Like our programs,
TLA+ models by Amazon engineers are executable and can be explored using model
checking to uncover subtle bugs. Newcombe et al. [13] acknowledge that modeling
systems in a high-level language like C, as we do, increases the productivity of the
engineers. More importantly, in addition to model checking up to certain trace lengths,
a model written in C lends itself to mostly automated verification using tools like VCC
that utilize automated constraint solvers, and that can verify unbounded instances of the
system. There have also been efforts towards formally modeling key-value stores like
Cassandra using rewriting logic in Maude [12]. However, this model checking approach
is either not exhaustive or is exhaustive on bounded instances, while ours is exhaustive
on unbounded instances. Recently, there has been work on programming languages
that ease development of distributed systems, in particular, with respect to consistency
properties at the application level [22] and fail-free idempotence [23]. Also, work by
Sivaramakrishnan et al. [24] introduces a declarative programming model for eventually
consistent data stores, that includes a contract language that can express fine-grained
application level consistency properties. Hawblitzel et al. [3] use TLA-style refinement
to verify an implementation of Paxos consensus in Dafny, while Woos et al. [25], verify
an implementation of the Raft consensus algorithm in the Coq proof assistant; both
approaches capture node and network behavior in a programming language setting,
like we do, but focus on top-down system development. Burckhardt et al [26] explore
logical mechanisms for specifying and verifying properties over replicated data types,
and propose a framework for specifying replicated data types using relations over events
and verifying their implementation using replication-aware simulations.
7 Conclusions
We have shown how formal properties of production key-value (NoSQL) storage sys-
tems can be inferred by finding properties that are provable for a high-level distributed
protocol model modeling the implementation. Furthermore, we have proposed a mod-
eling technique using programs in concurrent C, which gives executability of models,
testing, and mostly automated formal verification using the VCC tool. We have verified
both eventual delivery of the hinted-handoff protocol under transient failures as well
as eventual consistency of the read-repair protocol when arbitrary number of reads are
issued. We also discovered several surprising counterexamples during the verification
for related conjectures based on online documentation, and this experience helped us
develop a firm understanding of when and how these protocols guarantee eventual con-
sistency. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time these anti-entropy protocols
have been verified exhaustively using deductive verification. We believe the methodol-
ogy proposed in this work is promising and applying our methodology to a larger class
of production protocols (e.g., blockchain, Google’s Cloud Spanner) is interesting future
work.
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